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 Review of 'John R Searle-Thinking About the Real World' by Franken et al eds. (2010) 
     Michael Starks 
       ABSTRACT 
This book is the result of Searle's stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept in 2009 and all 
the papers except his introductory one and his final response are from persons associated with 
Munster. However all the papers were written or revised later and so are one of the most up to 
date looks at his views available as of mid 2013. S has in my view made more fundamental 
contributions to higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) than anyone since 
Wittgenstein and has been writing world class material for over 50 years. He is also (like W 
before him) regarded as the best standup philosopher alive and has taught and lectured 
worldwide. He is also one of the clearest and most careful writers in the field so one would 
think that every philosopher writing an article on his work would have an up to date and 
accurate understanding of his ideas. Unfortunately this book shows that this is far from true. All 
the 11 articles make major mistakes regarding his views and regarding what he (and I) would 
regard as an accurate description of behavior.  
Searle's obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two systems 
framework and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology as stated most 
dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I have noted in many 
reviews). It was Wittgenstein who did the first and best job of describing the two systems 
(though nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a major event in intellectual history. Not 
only is Searle unaware of the fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation of W, 
but everyone else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this 
book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with Evolutionary Psychology, which 
can enlighten all discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate evolutionary and 
biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate cultural ones. 
However, his comment on p212 is right on the money—the ultimate explanation (or as W 
insists the description) can only be a naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self, 
intention work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall Searle’s 
famous review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”. 
And this makes it all the more bizarre that Searle should repeatedly state that we don’t know 
for sure if we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
As he notes “The neuro-biological processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, 
described at different levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause bodily 
movement?…How can the hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what 
solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see analogously there 
is no philosophical problem left over.” 
 
2 
  
 
Also I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as commonly 
understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our representations.” (p223) as 
“Our life shows a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly 
challenged.” 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the greatest philosophers of 
recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his responses to the many basic confusions 
manifested in the articles by others. Since this review I have written many articles extending the 
framework of the logical structure of rationality and commenting in depth on Searle and Wittgenstein 
which are all readily available on the net. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view 
may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those 
interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature 
and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young 
science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather 
with that of certain branches of mathematics.  Set theory.) For in psychology there are 
experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion 
and methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the 
means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another 
by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source 
of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”(BBB p18).    
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it 
because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
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"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to 
(is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10  
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To 
think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it 
has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It 
is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) what would be 
called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labeled 
by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of insight which makes us 
use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that “something must make us” do what we 
do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason 
to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its 
object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now 
the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t 
the slightest similarity with what it represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously not aware of 
the many different usages of the word “proof”; and that they are not clear about the 
differences between the uses of the word “kind”, when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of 
proof, as though the word “kind” here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of 
apples.”  Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery” 
when in one case  we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other 
case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29   
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of 
phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the 
creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not 
exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of 
satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the 
world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a 
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proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out 
that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a 
representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has 
conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
 “Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP  5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of 
the mind lie open before us." BBB p6  
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems 
of life remain completely untouched.  Of course, there are then no questions left, and this 
itself is the answer.”  TLP  6.52  
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If 
your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most 
important facts.” 
 Z 220 
“Philosophy  simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.”  PI 126 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between 
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of 
investigation: it was a requirement.)”PI 107  
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we 
can discover something wholly new.  That is a mistake.  The truth of the matter is that we 
have already got everything, and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for 
anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this 
grammar is already there.  Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future.” (said in 1930)  Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979)p183 
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“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of 
recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it.  We 
have already said everything.---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution!….This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas 
the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations.  
If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” 
BBB p125 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an 
outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. In 
considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology 
of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked 
–i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere.   
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, 
philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to this topic that 
other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after noting W’s above remark on science 
envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further 
condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want to know when 
knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need to be clear what is 
ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an 
achievement, a performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is not the case 
that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case that p’? Why are there 
ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as 
opposed to faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and 
how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but not believe, 
something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – through many hundreds of 
similar questions pertaining 
not only to knowledge and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, 
observing, noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if 
these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the 
various concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context 
dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
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psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” 
(Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S),Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a 
New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology 
books, that I will refer to as the WS framework.  
To show this framework and how it relates to a contemporary view of  intentionality I have 
produced the following table. 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary 
processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), 
of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive 
Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, 
the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in 
my other very recent writings. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by Searle, 
and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human Nature by 
P.M.S Hacker.  The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. 
Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no 
gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2  and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes  
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental 
State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
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Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, 
Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of 
S1 are designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 by myself). 
*            Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***      Searle’s Intention In Action 
****    Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
9 
  
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is an 
effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, 
while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved 
into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, 
true-only, non-propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- 
such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic 
functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons.  That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 
(joyfulness, loving, hating)-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons 
(i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic 
physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but 
graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my 
hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential (CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and 
the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can 
become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other disciplines 
under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course 
these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, 
and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the 
norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
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dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide 
array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes 
the basic structure of behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world) 
(e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs 
from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by the 
automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to 
match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire 
(and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 
propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent 
upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In 
language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior 
intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as 
they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed 
into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations 
of S3, so that our normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This 
vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' and 
`consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of perceptions and reflexes., 
and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. 
As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, 
and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They 
both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that 
skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if 
true, life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and biology demonstrates, life 
must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
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I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our 
desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for 
Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior 
that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness 
(increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his 
description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the 
unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which 
often override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously 
create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of 
unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it 
is right but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive 
fitness of their distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the 
unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in 
targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological 
Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science 
Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully 
aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth 
conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' 
going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle 
of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is 
as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in 
language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony 
between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might 
note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there is 
a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well 
formed sentence expressing COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not 
a mental state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that 
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the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image 
its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 
Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls 
what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish 
before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing 
does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to 
talk, then I do know."  
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He dissects hundreds 
of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of 
system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) 
dispositions, and many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly.  With 
this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature 
that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, 
but I find that this evolutionary two systems view is the best.  To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s 
famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary 
psychology.”  
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all 
philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find 
the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to 
look deeper and to abandon the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The 
greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459).  Incidentally, the equation of 
logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human 
nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out).  
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be 
found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are 
quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his 
own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” 
is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions.  
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of 
a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching an 
adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly there is barely a mention.  
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., 
Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, 
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“framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”.  Of course these too are language games, so there will be 
more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of 
slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action 
cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of  “cognitive modules”, 
“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” 
or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP).  
Now for some comments on “John R Searle: Thinking About the Real World” (TARW).  
The first and most important comment is that since I wrote this review my ideas have 
continued to evolve so I strongly recommend reading my more recent articles first, especially 
The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
This book is the result of S’s stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept. in 2009 and all the 
papers except his introductory one and his final response are from persons associated with 
Munster.  However all the papers were written or revised later and so are one of the most up to 
date looks at his views available as of mid 2013. S has in my view made more fundamental 
contributions to higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) than anyone since W and has 
been writing world class material for over 50 years. He is also (like W before him) regarded as 
the best standup philosopher alive and has taught and lectured worldwide. He is also one of the 
clearest and most careful writers in the field so one would think that every philosopher writing 
an article on his work would have an up to date and accurate understanding of his ideas.  
Unfortunately this book shows that this is far from true. All the 11 articles make major mistakes 
regarding his views and regarding what he (and I) would regard as an accurate description of 
behavior.  
Recently there have been some exchanges between the two recorded in “Neuroscience and 
Philosophy” which appeared as a result of H’s views expressed e.g. in Philosophical Foundations 
of Neuroscience which I will review soon. Both authors score some points and miss critical ideas 
in the others work. I have noted S’s failure to appreciate W before. Hacker is representing W’s 
views or at least Wittgensteinian views most of the time so we get as close as we ever will to a 
confrontation between these two geniuses of descriptive psychology --W and S.  
 
Anyone interested in a concise demolition of Quine (another great mind who totally missed W 
and thus the whole enterprise of philosophy) should see Hacker’s paper ‘PASSING BY THE 
NATURALISTIC TURN: ON QUINE’S CUL-DE-SAC’ (though of course Q’s deconstruction has been done by 
many including S).  
14 
  
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes and the S2 
reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book Human Nature, esp. on p226-32 is critical for any 
student of behavior.  It is a nearly universal delusion that “cause” is a precise logically exact 
term while “reason” is not but W exposed this many times. Of course the same issue arises with 
all scientific and mathematical concepts. And of course one must keep constantly in mind that 
‘action’, ‘condition’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, ‘true’ etc. are all 
complex language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully described in BBB in the early 
30’s.    
On p21 we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in S’s work and one that should 
have been obviated long ago had he only read the later W more carefully.  He refers to free will 
as an “assumption” that we may have to give up! It is crystal clear from W that will, self, world, 
and all the phenomena of our lives are the basis for judging-the axiomatic bedrock of our 
behavior and there is no possibility of judging them. Can we “assume” we have two hands or 
live on the surface of the earth or that Madonna is a singer etc? Perhaps this huge mistake is 
connected with his blending of true only S1 and propositional S2 which I have noted. Amazing 
that he can get nearly everything else right and stumble on this! 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which he first discussed 
in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts of things that could become 
conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the first to comment on this noting that if you can’t 
speak of unconscious thoughts you can’t speak of conscious ones either (BBB).  Here and 
throughout his work it is unfortunate that he does not use the S1,S2 concepts as it makes it so 
much easier to keep things straight and he still finds it necessary to indulge in very un-
Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable syntactical elements, you can detach 
intentionality from its immediate causes in the form of perceptions and memories, in a way 
that it is not possible to make detachments of unsyntactically structured representational 
elements.” (p31) just says that with language came the dispositional intentionality of S2 where 
conscious thought and reason became possible.    
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) please see above and my reviews of his other works. 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states and his reference to mental states as 
representations (actually ‘presentations” in here) with COS, is (in my view) counterproductive. 
On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the apple we see is the COS of the CSR (i.e., cause is 
built in) perception of the apple and the reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch has the 
same status (i.e., a COS) as the deliberate planned movement of the arm. Thus the mental 
states of S1 are to be included with the actions of S2 as COS. Though I accept most of S’s 
ontology and epistemology I don’t see the advantage, but I have the greatest respect for him so 
I will work on it.  I have noted his tendency (normal for others but a flaw in S) to mix S1 and S2 
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which he does on p29 where he seems to be referring to beliefs as mental states. It seems to 
me quite basic and clear since W’s BBB in the 30’s that S2 are not mental states in anything like 
the sense of S1.   
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true only unconscious percepts, 
memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic EP.  As noted, one can read Hutto and 
Myin for a very different recent account of the nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1.   
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and which I have used 
as the basis for my extended table above.  
Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a revolutionary 
advance in our understanding of behavior. He has continued to develop the naturalistic 
description of behavior and on p39 he shows how ethics originates in our innate social behavior 
and language. A basic concept is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA) which is 
explained in his various books. For an outline see my reviews of his MSW and other works. He 
tends to use the proximate reasons of S2 and S3 (i.e., dispositional psychology and culture) to 
frame his analysis but as with all behavior I regard it as superficial unless it includes the ultimate 
causes in S1 and so I break his DIRA into DIRA1 and DIRA2. This enables the description in terms 
of the unconscious mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. Thus I would restate 
the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked to override their natural inclinations by making 
ethical considerations prevail” as “…people are compelled to override their immediate personal 
benefits to secure long term genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.”   
I won’t comment on the 11 papers, mostly of poor quality, which critique S, since he does a 
great job in his replies.  However I must draw attention to the only reference to W (p49) where 
the authors show they don’t have a clue about what he did.    
Any discussion of behavior benefits greatly from S’s concepts such as Prior Intention, Intention 
in Action, intentional gaps, DOF, COS, CSR etc. but these authors seem only vaguely aware of 
most of his writings.   
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two systems 
framework and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology as stated most 
dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I have noted in many 
reviews). It was W who did the first and best job of describing the two systems (though nobody 
else has noticed) and OC represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only is S unaware 
of the fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation of W, but everyone else is too, 
which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this book.  As usual one also 
notes no apparent acquaintance with EP, which can enlighten all discussions of behavior by 
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providing the real ultimate evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the superficial 
proximate cultural ones. 
Thus S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on p202 is in my view 
vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain is automatic true only S1, but as 
soon as we attend to it consciously (normally in msec) it becomes ‘seeing as’ and a 
propositional  (true or false) S2 function that can be expressed publicly in language (and other 
bodily muscle contractions) as well. Thus the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red or the 
pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or pain once we begin to reflect on it normally are blended 
together into one ‘experience’. And for me by far the best place to get an understanding of 
these issues is still in W’s writings beginning with the BBB and ending with OC. Nobody else has 
ever described the subtleties of the language games with such clarity. One must keep 
constantly in mind the vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, ‘experience’, 
‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do it—even S stumbles 
frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one can clearly restate all of p202 separating the 
true only nonjudgeable S1 from the propositional S2 then nothing about behavior can be said 
without confusion. And of course very often (normally) words are used without a clear 
meaning—one has to specify how ‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’  is to be used in this context 
and W is the only one I know of who consistently gets this right.  
Again on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional unconscious causal dispositionality 
only makes sense to me because I look at it as just another way to describe S1 states which 
provide the raw material for conscious S2 dispositionality which, from a biological evolutionary 
point of view (and what other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus, his comment on p212 is 
right on the money—the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the description) can only be a 
naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self, intention work and cannot meaningfully 
eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena.  Recall S’s famous review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious 
Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”.  And this makes it all the more bizarre that 
S should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if we have free will and that we have to 
‘postulate’ a self (p218-219).  
Also I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that the confusions are 
due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, idealism, materialism, 
epiphenomenalism etc.,  rather than in universal susceptibility to the defaults of our EP—TPI as 
he has noted, and bewitchment by language as beautifully described by W. As he notes “The 
neurobiological processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, described at 
different levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause bodily movement?…How can the 
hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity is causally…if you 
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analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see analogously there is no philosophical 
problem left over.” 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer only if in the 
utterance of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a condition that the object 
referred to satisfies; and reference is achieved in virtue of the satisfaction of that condition.” As 
“Meaning is achieved by stating a publicly verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth condition).”  
“I think it is raining” is true if it is raining and false otherwise.  
Also I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as commonly 
understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our representations.” (p223) as 
“Our life shows a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly 
challenged.” 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his responses to the many 
basic confusions manifested in the articles by others.  
 
  
 
 
 
  
